Common-pool resources and other shared resources frequently suffer from overextraction/overuse and associated negative externalities. In this paper we design a framed laboratory experiment on downstream water pollution to investigate (a) the importance of empathy vs. self-interest framing in determining the behavior of upstreamers regarding the negative externalities, and (b) the potential of downstreamers to influence the choices of upstreamers using non-monetary sanctions and rewards, alleviating the need for intervention by the local governments and regulatory institutions. Our results show that empathy framing has a much more significant impact on individual behavior than self-interest framing. Overall subjects behaved more profit-oriented in the self-interest framing and more egalitarian in the empathy framing. Lastly, negative emotional feedback is a powerful tool for changing behavior of subjects towards more environmentally friendly actions. Interestingly, positive emotional feedback is counterproductive for that. In general our results indicate that explicit emotional feedback, even though not expressed by everyone, works to the same degree as the implicit appeal to emotions through framing.
Introduction
The problem of shared resources, especially common pool resources (CPRs) (e.g., fisheries and forests), has been studied for decades. In case of CPRs, if the users are driven solely by self-interest and do not cooperate/coordinate their actions, overextraction occurs. However, over the years experimental researchers (see, among others, Ostrom & Walker, 1991; Sally, 1995; Balliet 2010; Cardenas et al., 2000; Ostrom, 2010) showed in the laboratory and in the field that users of CPRs are not always driven by strict self-interest and often manage to prevent the overuse (Note 1) of resources through (self-imposed) regulations and sanctions.
In the context of other shared resources unchecked self-interest and lack of cooperation/coordination may lead to negative externalities through pollution in addition to/instead of overextraction. For many flowing water resources (such as rivers and creeks) usage creates an upstream-downstream problem. If the upstreamers are motivated exclusively by self-interest and profit maximization, they are likely to impose negative externalities (in the case of farmers, for example, water pollution through chemical runoffs and soil erosion) on individuals living downstream. In contrast, if the upstreamers are motivated by empathetic considerations towards nature and/or the downstreamers, they may reduce negative externalities by undertaking costly actions.
This situation raises two interesting empirical questions. The first question asks whether there is a difference in behavior of the upstreamers, if their decision is framed as a decision mainly regarding profit maximization, taking into account the externalities of pollution, versus if their decision is framed as a decision mostly on preserving the cleanliness of water resources, taking into account profit maximization. The former case brings to the forefront self-interest considerations conditioned by empathy, whereas the latter emphasizes empathetic considerations tempered by self-interest.
The second question deals with the potential of downstreamers to influence the behavior of upstreamers without involvement of local governments and regulatory institutions via non-monetary sanctions and rewards (such as positive/negative word-of-mouth, campaigns to increase awareness about the problem, display of social (dis)approval, etc.). If such sanctions work and are powerful enough to significantly change the behavior of the upstreamers, then public policies and environmental organizations should focus on providing venues that facilitate the flow of information from downstreamers to upstreamers and communication between them.
In this paper we design a downstream water pollution game to investigate these two questions. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical underpinning of our study, Section 3 describes the experimental design and hypotheses, Section 4 analyses the results, Section 5 concludes.
Framing and (Dis)Approval Effects

Framing Effects
Experimental economists are rightfully concerned about the potential framing effect of instructions. The majority of economic experiments is framed neutrally and presents a context-free environment to minimize social cues of how one should behave and to minimize the influence of homegrown values on individual decisions in the laboratory. Neutral wording allows researchers to retain control over the factors that influence subjects' choices. However, in certain contexts it is impossible to avoid framing without making the task irrelevant. A number of studies examine the effect of framing in the instructions on individual behavior in the context of corruption (Abbink & Hennig-Schmidt, 2006; Barr & Serra, 2009) , public goods games (Andreoni, 1995; Cookson, 2000; Park, 2000; Fujimoto & Park, 2010; , sequential bargaining games (Brosig et al., 2003) , and altruistic giving in dictator games (Duffy & Kornienko 2010) . The existing experiments manipulating the framing of instructions can be separated roughly into two categories: procedural-oriented framing (which compares the different ways of representing the problem, e.g. neutral context vs. contextualized, or the type of payoff presentation) and priming-oriented framing (which suggests a particular value judgment, e.g. selfish vs. altruistic, positive vs. negative, take vs. give).
The effect of procedural-oriented framing is ambiguous. In bribing games, Abbink & Hennig-Schmidt (2006) showed that there is no difference between individual behavior exposed to neutral and framed/contextualized instructions, while Barr & Serra (2009) reported the opposite finding. In public goods games, Cookson (2000) found that changing the presentational variables (e.g. the formulation of the payoff function or the type of comprehension task) has a strong effect on experimental results. In sequential bargaining games, Brosig et al. (2003) reported the existence of a hot (ordinary sequential manner, i.e. the subjects respond to the choices made by their partner) versus cold effect (strategy method, i.e. the subjects submit a complete set of choices before play commences) (Note 2), while earlier research by Brandts & Charness (2000) did not find it.
The effect of priming-oriented framing is more robust. Andreoni (1995) and follow-up studies by Park (2000) and Fujimoto & Park (2010) demonstrated that subjects contributed significantly more to a public good under positive framing (investing in a public good) compared to negative framing (investing in a private good). Along the same lines showed that there is a framing effect when expressing moral judgment about contributions, with free-riding in a Give treatment being condemned more strongly than in a Take treatment. However, when one controls for contributions, monetary punishment and self-reported emotions are not sensitive to Give versus Take manipulation. In the dictator game Duffy & Kornienko (2010) showed that the subjects give more in an altruistic treatment (dictators are ranked in descending order according to the amount they give) as compared to a control and to a selfish treatment (dictators are ranked in descending order according to the amount they keep for themselves).
This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion in the experimental literature about framing effects by examining the priming-oriented framing effects in the context of environmental protection.
Social (Dis)Approval through Reward/Punishment and Emotions
Rewards and punishments are used to express social (dis)approval and increase fairness and cooperation in social dilemmas and situations involving distribution of income and assets. Experimental papers report that punishment is more effective than rewards in dictator games (Andreoni et al., 2003) , public goods games (Dickinson, 2001; Sefton et al., 2008; Sutter et al., 2010 , but not in Walker & Halloran, 2004 , and common pool resource games (van Soest & Vyrastekova, 2006) . Furthermore, Andreoni et al. (2003) show that both methods are complements rather than substitutes in enforcing the ideals/norms and reaching the specific objectives. This effect is particularly strong when the punishments and rewards are decided and implemented by the group members rather than by an exogenous institution (Sutter et al., 2010) .
Actions of individuals, both helping and hurting, are strongly linked to positive and negative emotions of the affected party (Offerman, 2002; Bosman & van Widen, 2002; Xiao & Houser, 2005) . Rewards and punishments represent positive and negative reciprocity and as such they are behavioral means to express positive and negative emotions. According to Fehr & Gächter (2002, p.139) negative emotions are the proximate sources of punishment: "Free riding may cause strong negative emotions among the cooperators and these emotions, in turn, may trigger their willingness to punish the free riders." Similarly, "costly punishment might itself be used to express negative emotions" (Xiao & Houser, 2005, p.7398) ; anger (regarding norm violations) and guilt are sufficient to induce punishment (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009) , and a higher intensity of reported positive/negative emotions increases the likelihood of reward/punishment (Offerman, 2002) . As positive and negative emotions are expressed in terms of reward and punishment, they, in turn, may also trigger emotions in a receiving party and cause a second round of reciprocation.
To the best of our knowledge there is no systematic investigation of the impact of expressed negative and (explicit) positive emotions (not just an absence of disapproval) by the affected party back on the affecting party. This link does not seem to be straightforward. Hopfensitz & Reuben (2009) showed that the effectiveness of negative emotions, expressed by the punishing party, depends on the reaction of those who are punished. Specifically, if the expressed negative emotions lead to anger this may cause retaliation, whereas if shame and guilt are the result, it may restrain the desire of the punished party to fight back (Hopfensitz & Reuben, 2009) . It is very plausible that the effect of positive emotions will be similarly contradictory. Positive emotions, expressed by the rewarding party, can trigger positive reciprocity in the rewarded party and further increase cooperation and altruistic actions. At the same time positive emotions signal that the rewarding party is satisfied with the outcome, which may encourage the rewarded party to be a little more selfish next time around and test a lower threshold of acceptability.
In this paper we conduct a 2-round game in which after the first round the affected party can express their emotions regarding the outcome/behavior to the affecting party. This allows testing how much this emotional response will influence the behavior of the affecting party in the second round.
Monetary versus Non-Monetary Rewards and Punishments
Several experimental studies demonstrate that non-monetary sanctions and rewards can be as efficient as monetary incentives in inducing cooperation and fair outcomes. Masclet et al. (2003) showed that contribution levels to public goods from both monetary and non-monetary sanctions (expressing a degree of disapproval) are similar, with non-monetary sanctions working better under partner, as compared to stranger matching. Bochet et al. (2006) found that both face-to-face and verbal communication through a chat room (with anonymity and with no facial expressions) have stronger effects on increasing contributions to public goods, than monetary punishment. Xiao & Houser (2009) showed in an ultimatum bargaining game that monetary punishment is more effective than informal sanctions (written messages) in promoting fairness. However, their results, taken together with Xiao & Houser (2005) , indicate that as a sanctioning mechanism expressing emotions is overall more beneficial for social welfare than costly monetary punishment, as it eliminates (pecuniary) welfare losses. López-Pérez & Vorsatz (2010) demonstrated that approval/disapproval (Note 3) feedback fosters cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma games as it increases awareness about the other's feelings and because individuals are disapproval-averse. However, the effect of positive and negative feedback is not the same. According to Dugar (2010) costless ratings of disapproval assigned by group members lead to the most efficient equilibrium in the coordination game, whereas ratings of approval cause just the opposite. Finally, Noussair & Tucker (2005) found that monetary and non-monetary punishments are complements rather than substitutes as they appeal to different populations and at different time horizons.
In our experiment we test the effectiveness of non-monetary reward and punishment through a discrete and standardized expression of emotions in inducing a more equal distribution.
Experimental Design and Procedures
Design of the Downstream Water Pollution Game
We model the environmental protection context by using a framed laboratory experiment on downstream water pollution. This is a three-player game. The first player is a farmer performing agricultural operations upstream (henceforth called Upstream Farmer or UF) who decides on the usage of conservation technology. This technology (called conservation tillage or CT, see Note 4) lessens the negative impact of farming on the water quality in downstream rivers and lakes, but is more costly than the alternative intensive tillage (IT, see Note 5) for the UF. The descriptions of agricultural technologies presented to the subjects in the instructions were significantly modified and simplified to avoid any misunderstanding and ambiguity. The UF's payoff ( ) in tokens depends negatively on her usage of conservation technology, specifically the amount of land (out of her endowment of 500 acres) she places under conservation tillage ( ∈ 0, 500 ):
The second player is an individual who is drawing her drinking water from the lakes and rivers downstream (henceforth called Downstream Water User or DWU) and incurs the cost of cleaning the polluted water. The DWU's payoff ( ) in tokens positively depends on the cleanliness of the downstream lake:
The third player has a dual role: he performs farming operations upstream (thus deciding on the usage of conservation technology) and, at the same time, lives on farms tied to rural water supply systems that draw water from the very stream passing through his own farmland, and is, hence, using drinking water from downstream 
The cleanliness of the lake is determined as the proportion of land placed under conservation tillage by the two farmers (UF and UF/DWU, see Note 6):
The game represents a zero-sum game, where the total group payoff is independent of the payoff distribution: the three players were sharing 3000 tokens. The structure of the payoffs was chosen so that each of the three players gets an equal payoff of 1000 tokens if the farmers choose / 250 acres, which leads to % 50% (for selected combinations of strategies and payoffs see the top half of Table 1 ).
The Nash equilibrium (conditional on the standard assumption of profit-maximizing behavior) for both UF and UF/DWU is to choose a zero level of conservation technology since for the UF/DWU the return on conservation technology is twice the return on the lake cleanliness. In this sense the decision of UF and UF/DWU to use non-zero levels of conservation technology is similar to altruistic giving in a dictator game. IT UF =0 500, 1500, 1000 500, 1250, 1250 500, 1000, 1500
Description: The table provides selected decisions of the UF and UF/DWU and their outcomes in EMPATHY FRAME and SELF-INTEREST FRAME treatments. The numbers in each cell represent the payoffs of the three players given the choices by UF and UF/DWU. The payoffs are written in the following order: UF, UF/DWU, DWU.
Experimental Treatments
We implemented three manipulations: two framing (empathy and self-interest) treatments using loaded language and one no-framing treatment using neutral language. In the framing treatments the players were referred to as UF, DWU, and UF/DWU. They were presented with the description of the upstream-downstream situation and asked to make decisions regarding the choice of tillage on their land. In the NEUTRAL FRAME treatment the players were Vol. 5, No. 3; versa; finally, the decision of the UF/DWU affects the DWU's payoff, but not vice versa (in the instructions the players were not told that the DWU will be able to send an emotional feedback and, thus, could not have reacted strategically to avoid/solicit it).
Hypotheses
The hypotheses deal with the framing effect, the difference between the decisions of UF and UF/DWU, and the effect of the discrete emotions expressed by the DWU towards the decisions of the UF and the UF/DWU.
The framing effect, if present, will affect two decisions: the usage of conservation technology by the farmers and the likelihood to send a smiley or frowney emoticon by the water user. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference neither between the EMPATHY and SELF-INTEREST FRAME nor between the loaded manipulations and the NEUTRAL FRAME. For the farmers' decisions, the alternative hypothesis is that the framing affects farmers' choice of the CT level and the following pattern will be observed:
• . The rejection of the null hypothesis would be in line with findings reported in similar situations by Andreoni (1995) , Park (2000) , Fujimoto & Park (2010) , Duffy & Kornienko (2010) . As for the likelihood to send an emoticon, the alternative hypothesis is that the loaded framing will result in a higher propensity to send a face than the NEUTRAL FRAME, and there will be relatively more smileys in the EMPATHY FRAME and relatively more frowneys in the SELF-INTEREST FRAME. However, in the case of emotional response, it is reasonable to expect that the null hypothesis will not be rejected as the DWU is more likely to be affected by the lake cleanliness and react on that, rather than on framing. This expectation is supported by the findings of , who showed that the propensity to punish in the public goods game is driven by the contributions rather than by the framing effect.
From the self-interest perspective and even accounting for empathy towards the DWU (since both farmers equally affect the lake cleanliness), the decisions of UF and UF/DWU about conservation technology are conceptually equivalent. The null hypothesis is that there will be no difference between the CT chosen by the two farmers within one treatment. The alternative hypothesis is that within one treatment / . The UF/DWU, by the nature of the situation, is better able to empathize, to "walk-in-the-shoes" of the DWU, while the UF can only imagine how it would feel like. In that sense, the position of the UF/DWU is similar to a situation in which people play non-symmetric games with switching roles [following the discussion by Brosig et al. (2003) about the comparison of simple bargaining game and a game with switching roles]. The UF/DWU is more likely to engage in self-reflection and empathetic considerations and will have more realistic beliefs on how it feels like being a DWU. The beliefs of the UF, on the other hand, may be less realistic and, thus, their decisions are expected to be less empathetic. In this case we would expect to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative. A rejection would be corroborated by the difference between bargaining and dictator games in which the players are switching roles and the games in which they do not [see the discussion in Brosig et al. (2003, p.85) comparing their results to Brandts & Charness (2000) ].
Finally, consider the effect of positive or negative emotions expressed by the DWU on the decisions of the UF and UF/DWU in the second round. The null hypothesis is that the emotional response will have no effect on the farmer's choices. The alternative hypothesis is that both smiley and frowney faces will encourage the farmers to increase their CT usage, with frowney being more effective in achieving that goal. As positive and negative emotions are shown to be linked to monetary rewards and punishments (Offerman, 2002; Bosman & van Widen, 2002) and those monetary rewards and punishments affect behavior, it is reasonable to expect that we will reject the null hypothesis. Along the same lines, as punishments were shown to be more effective than rewards (Andreoni et al., 2003; Dickinson, 2001; Sefton et al., 2008; Sutter et al., 2010; van Soest & Vyrastekova, 2006) , we would expect that expressing negative emotions will increase CT usage more than expressing positive emotions.
Procedures and Subjects
Each subject was assigned a 5-digit random number to assure anonymity. The experimental instructions were read to the participants aloud and also presented on their computer screen. In addition, each subject received two handouts: a 11X11 payoffs table with some of the possible combinations of strategies and a list of formulas to calculate the payoffs. Following the instructions the experimenter answered questions and the participants were presented with a quiz checking their understanding of the instructions and the calculation of the payoffs. After all subjects successfully completed the quiz they proceeded to the experiment.
In total, 216 subjects participated in the experiment: 84 in each of the EMPATHY and SELF-INTEREST FRAME and 48 in the NEUTRAL FRAME treatments, resulting in 28, 28 and 16 independent observations per treatment respectively. All subjects were recruited at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (the majority were students, 45% females, Significance level d the level of lake ss of the lake i rm of ) are e ign in front of heir negative em s, the higher s the odds rati e lake is, the lo s the odds ratio Vol. 5, No. 3; scenario. In line with the comment of a referee on the Alpizar et al. (2008, p.312) paper that "the framing effects do not only cause problems; sometimes they may be seen as an asset for the researcher" we argue that rather than avoiding framing in all experiments we should study its impact as interactions/communications in the field do not happen in neutral language and without context. In particular our results support that environmental policy should appeal to the empathy of polluters.
Second, perhaps not surprisingly, the subjects with a higher stake in the quality of the lake water contributed much more to the cleanliness of the lake than those with no stake. We observe this effect despite the identical Nash equilibrium for both types. This finding is in line with both, the neuroeconomics findings that the degree to which individuals have empathetic feelings depends on the situational factors (Singer, 2009 ) and the dual-interest and metaeconomics framework (Hayes & Lynne, 2004; Lynne, 2006) in that the UF/DWUs were placed into the situation of "walking-in-the-shoes-of" downstream water users and, thus, displayed more empathetic behavior than the UFs who could only imagine how it feels. In terms of policy this calls for increased exposure of upstreamers to the negative externalities of their behavior. In contrast to a traditional approach of fully internalizing the externality, our results support the contention that even a minor internalization, maybe even symbolic in nature, may suffice to significantly change behavior. In addition, typically UFs will be downstream to other negative environmental externalities, such as global warming, air pollution, and wind erosion. Pointing out/educating about the similarities of the consequence of their own actions to other people and the impact of these other negative externalities on themselves (asking them to project ownself into that dowsnstream situation) may then help to change the upstreamer's behavior.
Third, negative emotional feedback (non-monetary punishment), although costly, is an effective tool in positively influencing environmental choices. As Xiao & Houser (2005, p.7401) noted "the desire to express emotions, and constraints on that demand, are a ubiquitous feature of human social interaction" so it is worth utilizing this desire in addition to the standard policies of monetary sanctions and rewards and putting more emphasis on the dual-interest underlying such decisions. Our findings provide additional support for the effectiveness of policies that promote social punishment and public shaming as strategies to achieve lawful and/or cooperative behavior. 
